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Public institutions in Africa have run on imported energy
rather than on domestically available resources.
Goran Hyden, 1990, 44
Effective govemanee rests on a tripod base of good politicalleadership, capable public
institutions, and societal expectations. The politicalleadership provides the vision and
developmental goals. Capable public institutions translate vision and goals into plans,
programs, and policies. Societal groups reinforce the vision and help ensure accountability.
Aid dependency can affect all three of these. When a country is heavily dependent on aid,
donor goals and vision can come to substitute for those of a country's leadership. Foreign
experts and technical assistants substitute for public institutions, providing plans, programs
and policies. The deep involvement of aid donors in the affairs of the governent mean that
accountability can become something between governent and extemal actors, rather than
between a governent and its people. None ofthese outcomes is inevitable, but the
experience of aid dependenee suggests that these outcomes may be the rule, rather than the
exception.
Aid was originally conceptualized as a gap-filling mechanism, enabling countres to access
additional funding to supplement shortfalls in savings and foreign exchange (Chenery and
Strout 1966). Over time, aid has expanded far beyond its original gap- filling role, becoming
a large-scale and multi-faceted business, benefiting both developed and developing countres
alike. In more than twenty Afrcan countres today, aid accounts for 10 percent or more of
GDP. All of these countries are low income, and the effects of aid dep endene e are perhaps
difficult to separate out from a constellation of problems -- including skil shortages,
economic instability, and wrenching inequality -- facing many low income countries. At the
same time, some countries with low incomes per capita are less dependent on aid than others,
suggesting aid dependenee is not simply a function ofpoverty. Outside ofSub-Saharan
Afrca, China, Vietnam, Pakstan and India are all examples of countres poor in income, but
not generally considered aid 'dependent'. 1
This paper addresses the possible impact of aid dependenee on institutions in Afrca. We
focus primarlyon the public sector, but also briefly address the impact of aid dependenee on
institutions in the private sector (firms and NGOs). The next section wrestles with the issue
of defining aid dependence, and the methodological problems raised in trying to determine
its institutional impact. We then briefly discuss sources of aid dependenee in Afrca. The
fourth section considers the possible impact of aid dependenee on the critical fuctions of the
central governent: raising revenues and budgeting; making and implementing policies,
programs, and plans, as well as its impact on indigenous private sector and civil society
lThese countries all receive less than 4 percent of GNP in aid, and the experiences of aid ageneies working in
those countries suggests that they use aid as a relatively mIor input into established governent programs.
They all have large economies, however, and high levels of aid as a proportion of GNP may also reflect the
fixed costs of aid programs against small GNPs.
organizations.2 The fifth section offers a strategy for reducing the deleterious impact of aid
dependenee on economic and political institutions in Afrca.
On the positive side, high levels of aid (one measure of aid dependenee ) are associated with
more extensive politicalliberalization in Afrca in the 1990s, although, surrisingly, this
relationship does not hold when political conditionality is applied. In some countries, aid
dependenee allowed governents to fund for a time avision that led to increases in
education and living standards for the majority oftheir people. Tanana in the first post-
independence years is such a case. In others, high levels of aid were accompanied by donor
leverage that resulted in better policies in the short term, although there is no evidence that
aid itself enabled these policies to be sustained in the absenee of political commitment. In
yet other countres, such as Mauritius and Botswana, initially high levels of aid helped build
the development oflocal capacity, enabling them to 'graduate' from most bilateral aid
programs.
But for other countres, and for Tanana after the mid-1970s, the costs of aid dependenee
may have been unacceptably high. We argue that in the absenee of effective, committed
leadership, long-term dependenee on aid can serve to neutralize internal pressures for more
effective govemanee and to thwart the critical proeess ofleaming how to manage the
complexities of goveming. It also creates a specific set of institutional problems for
governents.
The costs of aid dependenee can include (1) institutional overload and capacity weakening;
(2) loss of sovereignty and weakened ownership of policies and plans, with consequent
sustainability problems; (3) revenue instability, repetitive budgeting, budget fragmentation,
wage distortions, and lower tax effort, with serious implications for the management of
monetary and fiscal policy; and (4) the undermining of accountability and democratie
decision-making. The private sector in an aid dependent country is primarly affected by the
'crowding out' effect. Large amounts of aid enable a governent to enlarge itselfbeyond
the boundares set by domestie revenues and to subsidize monopolistic state-owned
enterprises (through the fungibility of aid fuds). Through their tendency to appreciate
domestie currencies ('Dutch disease'), large amounts of aid may lead governents to tighten
credit policies and consequently squeeze private sector investment. Large amounts of
extemal aid reduce incentives for indigenous NGOs to develop a dues-paying membership or
local fudraising base, and by amplifying the 'voice' of extemal donors over that of other
possible constituents, aid dependenee affects accountability for NGOs just as it does for
governents. We have to emphasize, however, that these effects are not inevitable, and
much depends on the pre-existing quality of govemanee and the degree of
'developmentalism' in the leadership of an aid dependent countr.
Definitions and Methodology
This paper aims to examine the impact of aid dependenee on economic and political
institutions in Sub-Saharan Afrca. We use the standard definition of aid us ed by the
2We do not consider the impact of aid dependenee on the judiciar in this paper, although ths is an area that
would benefit from research.
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OECD's Development Assistanee Committee.3 Our own working definition defines aid
dependenee as a state where the level of aid becomes a decisive factor in the overall
performanee of the national economy. Aid dependenee can be a function ofthe size and
duration of aid, the type of aid, and the way aid is managed. In 1995, Afrcan countries
raised about 16 percent of GDP in taxes and other revenues, but spending was about 25
percent higher on average (Stotsky and WoldeMariam 1997: 7), suggesting that for most
countres, a shar drop in aid would have serious repercussions. But aid dependenee can also
be 'a state ofmind', as a Bangladeshi critic charges, 'where aid recipients lose their capacity
to think for themselves and thereby relinquish control' (Sobhan 1996: 122). Finally, aid
dependence was defined for this AERC/ODC project as 'a situation in which a significant
diminution or elimination of aid flows over a short period of time would produee serious
negative economic, political and organzational consequences for the recipient ofthat aid'
(Lancaster and Wangwe 1998).4
Institutions can refer to organizations, or they can refer to the 'rules of the game' (North
1990) in a socIal system: the norms, codes of conduct, laws, and pattems ofbehavior that
enable human interactions to have some degree ofpredictability. In our view, institutions are
based on organzations, but are broader, encompassing laws, pattems ofbehavior and
cultual values. For example, organizations such as political paries can become
'institutionalized', as they become embedded in and supported by laws, values, and socIal
norms.5 We are interested in the impact of aid dependenee on organzations that constret
budgets, manage economic policy, make decisions about program priorities, and car out
development initiatives. But we are also interested in the impact of aid dep endene e on the
'rules of the game', the proeesses and norms, codes of conduct, and pattems ofbehavior.
How can the impact of aid dep endene e on Afrcan institutions be measured? To start with
again, isolating aid 'dependence' from a more general assessment of the impact of aid itself
presents considerable problems.6 But in addition to this, we lack precise measures of
institutional quality, and there is no easy way to measure changes in institutions, for better or
for worse.7 Finally, there are intervening varables in the political environment that
complicate any assessment of the direct relationship between aid dependenee and
3 'To qualify as ODA, a transaction must meet the following tests: it is admistered with the promotion of the
economIc development and we1fare of developing countries as its main objective, and it is concessional in
character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent.' (World Bank 1997: 253).
4 In another context, Wangwe has dermed aid dependenee as a condition where increases in aid reduce an
economy's ability to generate se1f-sustaining growt (Wangwe and Lyakura 1998: 6).
5There is a long history of confusion and multiple use of these term in the literature on Africa. See, for
example, Arnold Rivkin's Nations by Design: Institution Bui/ding in Africa, Colloquium üirInstitution Building
and the African Development Proeess, University of California at Los Angeles (New York: Anchor Books,
1968), which states "institution' and 'strctue' are used interchangeably. Both are taken to mean organizations,
arrangements, relationships and practices, of an established nature, having political, economIc or socIal
purposes, and accepted as legitiate by the preponderant number ofpeople affected or concerned' (x). For a
useful discussion ofthis issue, see Johnston (1998): 44-47.
6 For a very useful recent analysis of the effectivenss of aid in Afrca, see the case studies in Carlsson,
Somolekae, and van de Walle (1997). See also Gwin and Nelson (1997).
7 Same researchers have attempted to measure institutianal development diectly. For two examples, see
Johnstan (1998) and Andersson and Winai (1998). Both ofthese efforts are quite prelimary, and indeed
Johnstan notes that 'There remains a lot to be done befare we have easily applicable methods for measuring
institutional development ready to hand' (59).
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institutions.
The only quantitative data we have on institutions is the by now well-known database that
rests on measures complied by political risk consulting firms. One version ofthis database
was put together by The IRS Center at the University of Maryland, and includes brief
measures of institutional variables for 31 Sub-Saharan Afrcan countries, mainly for 1990.8
The data are subjective and give businesspeople's ratings of the level of corrption, rule of
law, and bureaucratie quality in each country, measures that might reasonably reflect a broad
range of institutional varables. Only one Afrcan countr had 'high' quality institutions
(Botswana; Maurtius was not ranked). Twenty countries had 'medium' quality institutions,
and the institutional quality of ten countres was ranked '10w'. The correlation between leve!
of aid dependenee (measured by aid as a percentage of GNP) and institutional quality is
negative: -0.12. The correlation between aid dependenee and per capita income is also
negative: -0.45. But the correlation between institutional quality and per capita income is
positive, at 0.408, sugge sting that poverty and wealth may be more significant factors in
determining the quality of institutions than aid dependence.
This relationship between institutional quality and income leve! presents one ofthe two
major problems in any attempt to tease out the separate impact of aid dependenee on
institutions; the second is determining the intervening effect ofpoliticalleadership. The
impact of economic crisis and its accompanying institutional deterioration complicates
analysis even fuher.9 With the limited utility of the IRS data, the scarcity of any other
cross-countr work on institutional quality, and the absenee of survey data on attitudes (to
measure psychological aspects of dependenee ) it is diffcult for research on this topic to
avoid relying heavily on anecdotes.
One way for the case studies to address this problem wil be for researchers to ask
standardized questions in all the case study countries. Interviews and archival work can be
us ed to paint a pictue of changes in these institutional relationships over the past several
decades. Respondants can be asked to reflect on the impact high levels of aid, not simply aid
itself, have had on institutional practices and the 'quality' oflocal institutions, and ifpossible
to compare that impact with the situation in place before aid became such a large component
of governental activity. Questions that could be used in the case studies are inc1uded in an
appendix to this paper.
Sources of Aid Dependence
Why do countres become dependent on aid? Aid dependenee has its source both in supply
and demand. Aid dependenee may be temporar. Countres recovering from civil war or
other dis asters may have a high percentage of public expenditures covered by aid for a period
of time. But for too many countries in Afrca, aid dependenee has become a long-term fact
oflife, with roots in Afrca's initially low skillleveIs, poor politicalleadership and pattems
8 The scale was composed from survey data collected by a political risk consultig finn: International Countr
Risk Guide. It is not clear ifthis was a random sample surey. Institutianal quality involved three elements:
corrption, rule of law, and bureaucratie quality which together provide ascale with a total of 18 points. High
countries were ranked 13-18, and sa fort.
9 Thans to Nicolas van de Walle who pointed ths out, personal commmiication, June 30, 1998.
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ofneopatrimonial polities, the economic and debt crises since the 1970s, war and political
instability, and the institutional inerti a of international aid ageneies.
The newly independent nations of Afrca were not well-prepared for self-governance, and
many faced ethnc tensions that had been exacerbated by colonial rule. Local skil bases
were weak. Only six unversities had been established in all of Sub-Saharan Afrca, and in
1960, post-secondar emollment levels were about one-sixtieth ofthose in Asia and Latin
America. During their occupation oflndia, the British had established the Indian Civil
Service, providing a dens e network of several generations ofwell-trained civil servants with
a growing tradition ofmeritocracy. Few countres in Afrca had any comparable experience.
In Nigeria, for example, only fifteen percent ofthe upper leve! civil service positions were
filled by Nigerians as independence drew close (Mutahaba, Bagua and HaIfan 1993: 82).
In other countries, the percentage was even lower (Mo ore 1997). After independence, the
move toward one-part states did little to strengthen local institutions. As Arhur RIvkin
pointed out in 1968, 'the history ofunversities, cours, civil services, parIiaments -- to say
nothing of private or theretofore private voluntary groups -- in Afrca has been one of
subordination, take-over, and destruction by the one pary. . .(this) has made it all but
impossible for truly national institutions representative of and responsive to the total nation
to develop and grow' (17).
With these multiple weaknesses, it was not surrising that many countries relied on aid
fuding for technical assistance and expertise. The extent to which this was the case is
underscored by the experience ofCôte d'Ivoire. In 1980, stafffrom the World Ban and the
International Monetar Fund arrved in Abidjan to meet with the Ministr of Economy and
Finanee to negotiate the country's access to the IMF's Extended Fund Facility, and its first
W orId Bank Structual Adjustment Program. At the Ministr in the meeting room where the
all important negotiations were held, the IFI representatives found themselves on one side of
the table; on the other side sat French advisers. There were no Ivorians at the tab le (Mule,
29).10
Perhaps understandably, many Afrcans and others labelled these aid relationships 'neo-
colonialism.' But foreign aid also provided enormous political opportunities for some
Afrcan leaders. Advisers and their projects and programs came with fuding, vehic1es and
other expensive equipment, frequently constructed new housing for expatriates that would
later be occupied by governent officials, and fit usefully into patronage systems. Projects
could be established in varous regions of the countr to reward followers (Bates 1981;
Migdal1988). Aid funding meant that governents did not need to make the politically
difficult choice ofraising tax revenues to pay for their growth, and because of the fugibility
of aid, they had more flexibility to maintain economically costly but politically important
subsidies, such as those to state-owned enterprises. 11
The economic crisis that began in the late 1970s with a combination of oil price hikes,
lOMule points out that by 1985, ths situation had changed dramatically, and the Bank and Fund were by then
negotiatig with well-trained Ivoirian counterparts.
11 In Tanzania, for example, subsidies to the countr's state-owned enterprises and parastatals were the
equivalent of 150 percent of governent spending on health, or 72 percent of the education budget (World
Bank 1995: 1).
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commodity price drops, the accumulated impact ofpoor policies, and a slowing ofworld
growth and demand proved a major watershed in Afrca's experience of aid. Squeezed
between their lower revenues (paricularly from commodity exports, whose prices plunged)
and higher costs (inc1uding debt finance), Afrcan countries became ever more dependent on
aid. Frequent devaluations also made it difficult to capture the tre impact of aid levels as a
percentage ofGDP, as the value ofGDP expressed in dollars was constantly shrnking. In
one ofthe more extreme examples, as Table 1 indicates, aid to Tanana ballooned from 3 to
56 percent ofGDP (measured in $US) between 1970 and 1990. The stabilization and
strctural adjustment programs put in place to tr and address the crisis contributed to a
vicious circle of aid dependenee and eroding capacity.
Table 1: Indicators of Aid Dependency for Tanzania
Year aDA as
a % of
GDP
aDA as
% of
Exports
aDA as %
of Govt.
Expend.
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
3
8
15
8
56
23
20
79
132
170
293
80
14
37
37
26
113
N/A
Source: Bagachwa, et al, A Study on Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania: The Case of Danish
Aid. Dar es Salaam, 1997 (for 1970-1990), cited in Catterson and Lindah (1998: 19), and,
for the 1995 figues, World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washigton, DC: World
Bank, 1998).
Note: These two sources may not use the same data.
As donors and lending ageneies provided budget and balanee of payments support, one of
their first concems was to stem the hemorrhage on the fiscal side. Dictating budget priorities
and expenditue parameters externally cut away at one of the critical govemanee functions of
Afrcan states. Budget and balanee of payments support came with conditions that by their
nature were choices governents would not otherwise have made, reducing their autonomy.
Additionally, the severe restraints on the central budget and donor reluctance to support
recurent costs meant in practice that salares for Afrcan offcials plumeted in real terms
even before any structual adjustment programs were put in place. In 1983, Nigerian salares
for permanent secretares, the highest civil service post, were only 30 percent oftheir 1975
leve!, in real terms, while in Ghana, permanent seeretares saw their salaries fall to 11 percent
of the 1975 level (Lindauer, Meesook and Suebsaeng 1988). Corrption increased, fueling
donor demands for additional parng down of the state. In many countries, the combined
impact of corrption and donor pressure to prue the state (trade liberalization, the
elimination ofmarketing boards, etc.) weakened the state's critical capacity to generate
revenues, adding to aid dependence.
A fourh factor promoting aid dependenee is the high degree of political instability in Afrca.
More than half of the countries in Sub-Saharan Afrca have had significant political
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instability since independence, including civil war and violent coups (Coller and Gunng
1994). Political instability disrupts domestie revenue generation both because investment,
production, and trade generally drop during the period of instability, and because tax
collection becomes much more diffcult. This, in turn, increases the dependenee of countries
on aid receipts.
Finally, aid dependenee is also related to institutional imperatives and inerti a in the
international ageneies established to assist developing countres. The present foreign aid
regime has its origin in the vacuum left by the dec1ine of colonialism, which meant that new
institutions were needed to govem the relations between the developed and less developed
world. The establishment of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and a host
of bilateral aid ageneies marked a major shift in the pattems ofinteraction between the high-
income 'north' and the low-income 'south.' At present, there are more than six multilateral
ageneies, more than 17 UN ageneies that address development, more than 25 bilateral
donors, and countless numbers of international NGOs, some ofwhich rival bilateral donors
in their fuding transfers and programs. The poorest countries might attract representatives
of all ofthese institutions. In many aid ageneies, careers are made on the basis ofloans and
grants committed and disbursed. Yet even when their presenee is clearly not leading to
'development' by any measure, it is rare that aid ageneies leave a country. In this regard,
perhaps the issue is not so much aid dependence, but aid 'interdependence'. Both donors and
recipients are locked into a system that seems unable to produee development with
consistency or predictability.
Sources of Effective Governance
We will go out on a limb and claim that it is not really possible to have effective govemanee
in the absenee of any one of the three bases of good leadership, public institutions with
techncal and managerial abilities, and societies that provide the pressure for and expectation
of areasonably well-working state. How do countries reach this point? What are the sources
of effective govemance?
Good leadership can be serendipitous, where exceptional people are in the right place at the
right time, but, paricularly in the 'second generation' ( or more) after independence, good
leadership is also likelya function ofhaving a broad base ofwell-educated, skilled people to
draw from, a system of accountability that creates incentives to govem reasonably well, and
the happy coincidence of a developmental vision that is technically workable. One can have
a charsmatic (and well-educated) leader like Tanzania's Julius Nyrere, whose vision of
llamaa ultimately created such diffculties for his people. But one can also have a less
charismatic figure like Maurtius's Anerood Jugnauth, who piloted his island nation through
an economic crisis and into a prosperous period ofbroad-based economic growth, supported
by a capable public administration and societal expectations for the continuation of growth in
the context of a modified socIal democracy.
A capable public administration is also critical for the translation of good leadership into
effective programs and policies. At the highest levels of economic management, it is critical
to have a team oftechnocrats who understand the complicated interactions between policy
choice and economy response. The line ministres need to be staffed by people who are
skilled in their techncal functions, and who are overseen by administrators skilled in public
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management. Regulations and standard operating procedures governng the public sector
need to be c1early promulgated and to offer incentives for behavior that supports effective
planning and implementation. Statistical services need to provide the information required
for monitoring and policy adjustment. Tax collection ageneies need to be efficient and fair in
their collection ofthe revenues necessary to fuel governental programs. Transparency,
regularized auditing and more broadly, a rule of law, are important for enforcing
expectations ofprobity.
Society provides the incubator both for effective leadership and for a capable public service.
Political scientist Robert Putnam's 1993 research on the sources of effective and responsive
govemanee in North-Central Italy found that civil society -- the relative density of
associationallife and the concurent socIal capital and trust created by membership in
voluntary and social organizations -- accounted for a great deal of the positive varanee in the
quality of govemanee on the state (as opposed to the central) level in Italy. It is not
surrising that this might be so, for after all, the state can be seen as a societal institution, and
all its members and personneI are at the same time members of a society and affected by the
norms, values, and institutions present in society.
It is important to emphasize the synergy among these three bases of effective govemance.
Although leadership matters, even the finest leaders can do little without the proper tools and
resources, information, managerial and technical expertise, appropriate policy instruments,
and revenues. The capacity ofthe public institutions that carr out developmental policies
and programs depends on a societal base: policy networks that draw on the expertise of
interest groups and non-state institutes, a broad base of skilIs which underpin effective
governent service, and an intoleranee for abuse of the public trst. Organized socIal forces
provide the incubator for effective leadership and good govemance. Good leaders are
themselves drawn from society, and hold a mandate to rule, as the ancient Chinese believed,
only insofar as they govern both wisely and well.
Do high levels of aid dep endene e always undermine the development of good leadership,
effective public administration, and social capital? Not necessarily. A combination of good
leadership and policies that boost self-reliance can ensure that high levels of aid are well-
used to promote a national development strategy. The experience of East Asia is instructive
in this regard. 12 Both South Korea and Taiwan received high leve1s of aid from the United
States governent durng the 1950-1965 period when they were most under threat from their
Communist other halves. 13 In Taiwan, economic aid as a percentage of GNP between 1953
and 1963 amounted to about 7 percent of GNP, 38 percent of gross investment, and 40
percent of governent expenditues. In Korea, economic aid over the same period averaged
13 percent ofGNP, 96 percent of gross investment and 76 percent of governent
expenditure. Military aid in both countres was additional to these figures and was evenh "d 14greater t an economic ai .
12 Examples of African countres that have avoided aid dependenee include Botswana, Maurtius, and possibly
Eritrea, discussed below.
13 Figures for aid cited in ths paragraph are drawn from Jacoby (1967: 156).
14 U.S. economIc aid to Korea totalled about $6 bilion, and mIlitary assistance was $7 bilion (Bahl, Kim and
Park 1986: vi); economIc aid to Taiwan totalled about $ 1.5 bilion, and mIlitary assistance about $2.5 bilion
(Jacoby 1967: 40, 118)
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These high levels of aid differ from the high levels received by Afrcan countres in several
respects. First, the US. was the only signficant bilateral donor. This meant that neither
country experienced the problems that occur when a country is highly dependent on aid, but
that aid comes from numerous sources: diffculty in coordinating donors, conflicting
messages and conditions, and the much higher trans action costs associated with multiple
fuding sources. Second, the 'aid ideology' and thus the content of US. aid in the 1950s and
1960s was different from that currently in vogue. And third, this aid did not create long term
dependency.
In East Asia, the US. emphasized the building ofinstitutions and productive infrastrueture.
In Korea, for example, US. aid financed the establishment of the joint US.-Korean
Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), and in Taiwan, the semi-autonomous Council on
US. Aid, (later reorganized as the Council on International Economic Cooperation and
Development, CIECD), and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstrction. The ECC in
Korea and the CIECD in Taiwan became centers for development planng, foreign
investment coordination, and economic policy reform strategy and were maintained and
strengthened after the termination of US. aid. The US. also used aid as leverage to
implement extensive land reforms, paricularly in Taiwan. Large amounts of aid in the
1950s were clearly helpful in Taiwan and Korea in repairing the infrastrueture damaged
during the war and the large commodity import program helped feed and c10th more than a
million refugees. The early emphasis on infrastreture was modelled after the successful
Marshall Plan us ed to help rebuilt war-torn Europe, and the electricity produetion, roads, and
harbors financed by aid were critical for the competitiveness of exports, later.
In contrast, Afrcan aid programs in the first two decades after independence were influenced
by new ideas emphasizing a more experimental (and ultimately unsuccessful) approach
intended to meet the needs ofthe poor more directly, particularly through integrated rual
development programs. By the late 1970s, one critic charged that 'projects intended to build
the institutions or infrastrueture of developing countries are now undertaken surreptitiously,
ifat all' (Cotter 1979: 107). Between 1960-69 and 1970-79, World Ban lending for
infrastrueture (transportation, telecommunication, electricity) in Afrca shrank from 69
percent ofloans to 39 percent (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997: 696). Much of the difference
was made up by a doubling of funding to rural development and agrcultue, which might
have been a good idea, except that the area development programs were highly experimental
and in Afrca, they were widely recognzed to have largely failed (Hazlewood 1991: 137).15
Donor-fuded 'by-pass' organzations were established to more efficiently administer aid
monies, but they were focused on paricular projects, existed in multiple forms, and were
generally divorced from regular governent operations, rather than overseeing them.
15 The 1997 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb history of the World Bank's first fifty years notes that world-wide, 'The
pace of the area-projects expansion was explosive. . . (lending for these projectsJ (in constant 1984 dollars) rose
from $14.4 million a year to $556.4 million annually, which translates to an annual growt rate of 50 percent! . .
. the relative concentration in Africa was strg; area projects altogether domiated the Bank's AR portolio
for that contient. Furter, the problems in the area projects category were tyical of the difficulties that, durg
the McNamara years, beset the Bank's ARD work thoughout most of Africa (415). . .In Afrca... the Ban's
interventions may have delayed the development of effective, self-reliant cadres and institutians ' (421). The
recent history of the World Bank' s first fifty years notes that between 1976 and 1980, ahnost 60 percent of the
Bank's agricultue operations in Africa were considered unsatisfactory (Kapur et al, 1997: 422).
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Finally, US. aid did not create long-term dependency in East Asia. High levels of aid helped
to finanee an environment that enabled Korea and Taiwan to 'graduate' from dependence,
while giving them the means to do so. 16 In Taiwan, economic aid from the U.S. terminated
in 1965 after only 15 years, and Taiwan's membership in the World Ban, the IM, and the
United Nations ended in 1971 upon the UN's recognition of the People's Republic of China
in Beijing as the offcIal governent of China. US. economic aid to Korea lasted a little
longer, but that country also received a deadline and the same stimulus to diversify its
sources of foreign exchange and investment capitaL The knowledge that aid would be
terminated helped push a leadership interested in legitimacy and survival to put more
performance-oriented, export-directed policies in place, policies that assisted both Korea and
Taiwan to fill their savings and foreign exchange gaps largely through domesticallyd 17generate resources.
The Institutional Impact of Aid Dependence
The impact of large amounts of foreign aid can be either positive or negative for institutions
and organizations in Afrca. Many of the programs financed through foreign aid achieve
positive results, and can strengthen ageneies in and outside of the state through training,
reorganzation, and the provision of new technologies for data collection and analysis. Some
countres such as Botswana and Maurtius have, like Korea and Taiwan, managed large
quantities of aid with noticeably positive impact. We suggest below that the reasons for these
countries' greater success with aid have to do with the quality oftheir leadership, as
expressed in better policy choices and better management of the aid system from the early
stages of aid.
In other countries, in the short term, the influence of aid donors and the aid they provide may
even have prevented the breakdown of the state itself. James Fearon cites the case of Sierra
Leone where aid dependency by many measures has traditionally been high (in 1994 aid
amounted to 36 percent ofGNP), giving the World Bank and the IMF enormous short-term
leverage. Fearon argues that the 'international norms and institutions' that accompaned the
aid reinforced those in the governent who were opposed to the efforts by some politicians
to let the state collapse into a series of 'private agreement(s)' with gem and mineral traders
(128). This is c1early one possible institutional impact of aid dependence, to maintain the
state itself as the primar institution of govemance, in the face of internal and extemal
pressures pushing for its collapse.
Yet aid dep endene e has the potential to have considerably more insidious institutional
impacts. Aid dep endene e can exacerbate the problems of an underdeveloped administration.
Long term techncal assistance without skill transfer, and the extemal design of policies,
programs, and projects, undercut the learnng proeesses that new nations inevitably undergo,
and when extended over time, are bound to promote apathy, resentment, and low levels of
16 ane impact of the recent economic crisis in Korea is that the countr has again become eligibile for World
Bank funding, after 'graduatig' in 1994.
17 The actual impact of the 'deadline' for a termation of aid in Korea is discussed in Bahl, Kim and Park
(1986), Haggard (1989); and Woo (1991).
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confidenee among Afrcan civil servants. These can affect the norms, values, and pattems of
behavior -- the institutional framework -- within which governents must operate.
Countries highly dependent on aid lack the leverage they require to manage their donors and
reduce the 'tiedness' oftheir aid. Differences between the timing of different donor fuding
cycles and host governent budget requirements, and failure of donors to report changes in
project fuding commitments and disbursements can lead to budget fragmentation, make a
mockery ofbudget cyc1es, and undercut governent efforts to gain control of expenditures.
Perhaps most importantly, aid dependenee can undermine the legitimacy of governent
leadership, the accountability that should exist between a governent and its people, and the
budding role of democratie decision-making. We discuss these potential institutional
problems below as they arse in the context of specific institutions and practices: (1) project
and program implementation, (2) finance, budgeting and planng, (3) tax effort, and (4)
democratie govemanee and accountability.
(1) Project and Program Implementation
Countres that are heavily aid dependent may find that large numbers of donors and projects
make it much more difficult to manage national development. Multiple donors can lead to
duplication of efforts and high trans action costs. Donor goals and vision often substitute for
the goals and vision of the politicalleadership, reducing local ownership. Rather than being
'built' , the institutions of a weak and aid dependent state may simply be by-passed. Finally,
heavy doses oftechncal assistanee can be hazardous for local capacity.
High Transaction Costs. High levels of aid dependenee are generally associated with
multiple aid donors and greatly increased transaction costs for governent officials. Nearly
15 years ago an aric1e by Elliot Morss (1984) commented on the 'institutional destruction'
experienced by Malawi as it attempted to manage 188 projects fuded by 50 different
ageneies, its development efforts reduced to tring to follow up on the continuous and
different demands ofthis myrad of donors. Yet compare this with Zimbabwe in 1996 (91
aid ageneies), Kenya in 1996 (2000 donor-fuded projects), Tanana in 1997 (1800 donor-
fuded projects) or Mozambique, with 405 donor-funded projects in the health sector alone!
Each donor has its own procedures, monitoring and evaluation requirements, procurement
systems, commercial interests, and oversight missions. Merely servicing these multiple
stakeholders requires enormous amounts of governent time, often at the highest leveIs. In
Ghana, senior officials were estimated to each spend as much as 44 weeks a year facilitating
or paricipating in donor supervision missions (Sawyerr 1997: 7). These high trans action
costs of governng in an aid dependent context help explain why so many low income
countres are unable to maintain controlover aid.
Durng the 1980s, ths problem worsened. Through a period that witnessed the partial
collapse of the state in many countries, and the shifting by the W orId Ban of some of its
fuding to strctual adjustment loans, donor projects continued.18 World Ban adjustment
18 Except for ane year (1990), adjustment disbursements at the World Bank never exceeded 28 percent of total
disbursements (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997: 536). The rest was disbursed to projects. The same source
notes that the 'IBRD drastically cut lending (in Africa, at the beging of the 1980s) for creditwortess
reasons' (747). The number ofprojects also declined by the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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lending in 1985 came to only $230 million, while program and project lending amounted to
$1800 milion. In 1990, adjustment lending had risen to $1260 millon, but nonadjustment
lending was $2600 millon (Lancaster, 1997: 165). As economic crisis lowered
governent's effectiveness in general and as the flow of aid fuding exceeded the absorptive
capacity of the country, donors faced a choice between reducing project aid flows until they
reached alevel that would be manageable by the governent, or stepping outside ofthe
governent. They chose the latter course.
By-Passing Governent. Instead of the slower route ofworking within existing institutions
to build their capacity, donors frequently implemented their projects through temporary,
semi-autonomous project management unts that 'by-passed' weak governent offces and
civil service regulations.19 The series ofintegrated area development projects in the 1970s
and 1980s were particularly notorious for doing just this, but the practice is widespread even
today. The rise ofNGOs in the 1980s also contrbuted to the bypassing of dependent
governents. By the early 1990s in The Gambia, more than 100 international and local
NGOs were managing projects, and NGOs were responsible for more than 10 percent of
extemal aid funding. (Bräutigam 1994b). In the short term, the use ofNGOs allowed some
communities to receive services, but NGOs c1early cannot substitute over the long term for
an effective and capable governent.
Semi-autonomous project management units (PMUs) allowed donors to supplement low
governent salaries and add benefits for officials seconded to the PMU. Managing
development in this way is not doomed to ultimate failure. In fact, the highly successful U.S.
aid program in Taiwan also fuded a 'bypass' organization, the interministerial Council on
International Economic Cooperation and Development, which also was able to pay higher
salares and recruit skilled staff(Jacoby 1967: 58-63). A critical difference, however, was
that this bypass organzation was valued by the governent in Taiwan, and it did not take
over the fuctions of the existing line ministries, but rather performed a coordination and
planning role. The governent continued to fud and maintain the CIECD after aid funding
ceased. It became a key featue of the governent, not something imposed from outside,
and there was consequently no need to fold its fuctions back into the regular civil service.
The governent c1early 'owned' this strategy, which has often not been the case with similar
bypassing in Afrca.20
Ownership. Although 'ownership' is widely assumed to be a critical factor in development
interventions, it is rarely defined in any rigorous way. The single exception appears to be
research by Johnson and Wasty at the World Bank, who measured 'borrower ownership'
using four independent varables: (1) locus ofinitiative, (2) leve! ofintellectual conviction
among key policymakers, (3) expression ofpolitical will by top leadership, and (4) efforts
toward consensus-building among varous constituencies (1993:4-5).21 Their study
19 Some donors, such as Germany's GTZ, were early to recognize these problems and established their
integrated rural development projects within the existig govemmental mIistr operations. See Brautigam
(1988).20 As a possible exception, it wil be useful to follow the progress of the Free Compulsory and Universal Basic
Education Program in Ghana, as described in Sawyerr (1997). It wil be same tie befare it is possible to see if
ths effort at collapsing 16 donor bypass project implementation units into a single bypass Projects Management
Unit bears sustainable frit.
21 Each dimension of ownership was rate d according to four-level scale intended to capture the intensity of
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determined statistically that ownership of reforms was strongly associated with the success
of adjustment programs. In a similar vein, Brunetti and Weder (1994) found that a
governent' s lack of political credibility strongly affects growth. If reforms are negotiated
within a governent, and between a governent and its society, rather than imposed from
outside, the proeess is likely to take longer, but affected groups are more likely to have had a
chanee to voice their concems. This makes it more likely that a signficant sector of the
governent (and the governed) wil 'own' the reforms and also see them as more
sustainable, and therefore more credible.
The rise of adjustment lending gradually legitimized an unprecedented degree of external
ownership of policy decisions normally made by the politicalleadership of a country. In
many ways, structural adjustment programs and the budgetar support they provided might
have been a capacity-building and institutional-strengthening initiative. Indeed, Afrcan
leaders had been calling for a shift from project to more flexible program aid. However, the
sense that these were crises that needed to be addressed urgently, as well as the well known
ideological differences between Afrcan policyelites and the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) in Washington meant that the IFIs frequently wrote Afrcan governents'
adjustment programs and brought them to Afrca.22 Although Afrcan participation in
strctual adjustment program design has been improved in the 1990s, many governents
experienced a loss of sovereignty and consequently weakened commitment to programs
imposed from outside.
The lack of ownership was not limited to adjustment programs. The increased use ofproject
management units reduced governent officials' sense of ownership ofprojects. When the
World Bank began to encourage member countries to produee National Environmental
Action Plans (NAPs) in 1987, many low income countres were slow to take advantage of
the assistanee offered by the Ban. Frustrated with the slowness, and eager to show pro gress
in environmental matters to forstall its critics, the Bank then 'compelled IDA governents to
complete their NEAPs by June 1993', a decision that effectively led to the hured
preparation ofNEAPs by NGOs and outside consultants, with little governent ownership
(Dorm-Adzobu 1995: 29). Countres eligible for IDA funds are, of course, generally those
that are most heavily aid-dependent.
+
Although the World Bank was at the forefront ofthose emphasizing local ownership as a
critical component of effective lending, the Ban has been slow to act to change its own
practices. Within the Afrca Region of the Bank, for example, recently revised guidelines
take it for granted that Bank staffwil be writing concept papers for projects themselves,
rather than reacting to needs identified and proposed by Afrcan governents. 'No set
measures are prescribed for making sure that borrower nationals are involved and committed
ownership. For example, at the highest ownership level for 'locus of initiative', 'the initiative for formulating
and implementig the adjustment program was clearly the borrower' s.' At the lowest level, 'the program was
prepared by the Bank and funding extended, despite govemmental disagreement and reluctance to implement
same aspects ofthe program' (4). Surrisingly, this study appears to be the only cross-countr empircal
research testing the actual impact of ownership on development outcomes.
22 There were certainly exceptions to ths. Ghana's adjustment program was clearly wrtten by Ghanan
governent economists, for example. Outside analysts who wrote the recent history of the World Bank since
1945 called it 'an outstanding example of recipient ownership ofmacro reform' (Kapur, Lewis and Webb
1997: 587).
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at every stage of the project proeess' (Mule, 17). These low levels of ownership are likely
also associated with low levels of state capacity.
State Capacity. Afrcan governent's low capacity levels have multiple sources, and aid
dependenee is but one possible contrbuting factor (Bräutigam 1996). Paricularly important
is the impact oftwo or more decades of economic crisis and retrenchment. Stafflayoffs and
severanee packages often induced the most capable staff to leave governent, while
working conditions for those left behind san to appalling leveIs. But aid dependenee also
directly affected local capacity: through the erosion of state capacity by aid ageneies who
often hired the most qualified staff away from their governent positions, and through ready
provision oftechncal assistance (often without charge), undermining the incentives to
develop capacity locally.
In many countries, salaries and benefits for local employees of aid ageneies and NGOs are
generally vastly better than anything the governent can offer, and the working conditions
approximate those available in Europe or North America. Some studies have pointed out
that the leadership and staff of new development NGOs funded by donors were often
formerly high level staff in related ministries (Meyer 1992). In Kenya, even though donors
were complaining bitterly about the ineffectiveness oftheir counterpar training and
education programs for Kenyan governent economists, who refused to stay in the
governent once trained, John Cohen pointed out that 'it is primarly the donors who are
poaching economists' trained under these programs (Cohen 1992: 500). Donors offered
Kenyan economists staffpositions at up to five times the staring salaries (plus benefits) they
would have received in the public sector. For its part, the governent failed to enforce a
bond system it had instituted to avoid this problem. Cohen notes that aid ageneies 'must
come to recognize that it is pure sophistry to argue that even ifKenyans leave the positions
they were trained for there is stil a net increase in national capacity. Ending the dep endene e
on advisors requires that those trained to replace them stay in their positions' (506). Efforts
under the Special Program of Assistance to Afrca (SPA) and the OECD's Development
Assistanee Committee (DAC) to develop guidelines that would halt these practices have
apparently been ineffective (Engberg-Pedersen 1998: 218).23
On the other hand, the provision oftechncal assistance, often on a grant basis, reduces the
incentives that governents like Kenya have to keep their skilled staff, either through
enforcing a bond system, or through improving working conditions and salares.24 Not long
ago the World Bank's former Vice President for Afrca blasted technical assistanee in a
speech delivered at an Afrcan-American Institute conference: Techncal assistance, he
charged, 'is a systematie destrctive force which is undermining the development of capacity
in Afrca. And most of this techncal assistanee is imposed, it is not welcome and there is no
demand for it really, except on the donor side. ,25
23 Apparently there has been same success in these efforts in parts of Southern Africa. Personal
communication, Tor Halverston, Bergen, Norway, October 1, 1998.
24 Given spending limts, the latter would have to be done through a deliberate, and politically challenging
reallocation of existig resaurees.
25 Edward V. K. Jaycox, 'Capacity Building: the Missing Lin in African Development,' address delivered at
the African-American Institute Conference on African Capacity Building: Effective and Endurg Parterships,
Reston, Virgina, 1993.
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The more aid dependent a countr is, the more it is likely to have this techncal assistanee
imposed on it. For example, in 1993, techncal assistanee made up 42.6 percent of all aid
going into Tanania (Sobhan 1996: 119). When techncal assistance is sought by a
governent to fulfi a clear 'felt need' - as, in the 19th centu, the Japanese sought out
British, Prussian, and American experts, and the Thai monarch sought out British advisers to
supervise his revenue and expenditure restructung - they are far more likely to retain the
knowledge. Capacity building, like other development tasks, needs to be handed back to
governents, to be planed, budgeted and financed locally.
(2) Finance, Budgeting, and Planning
Relying on extemal sources for a large proportion ofthe governent' s budget can create a
c1uster of institutional problems for Afrcan governents heavily dependent on aid.
Maintaining budget discipline becomes much more difficult when budget cyc1es of donors
and their parters differ and when donors lack transparency. Budget fragmentation and
repetitive budgeting become common. Budgets that are essentially aggregates of donor
projects can easily become divorced from coherent plannng and make it diffcult for
governents to adhere to their own priorities, particularly when they need to adjust the
public expenditure program. Donor provision of counterpar fuds may exacerbate rather
than ease local fuding problems. Donor imposed remedies such as cash budgets may
worsen capacity weaknesses. Large and unpredictable aid flows can complicate
macroeconomic management and may prornote Dutch disease. In countries highly
dependent on aid, where the budgetary apparatus has broken down, the policy framework
and planng proeess may shift entirely to Washington, with targets, sectoral spending
criteria, and benchmarks developed by the IFIs. Yet there is little recognition that one cause
of the budget being in such disarray is the system offoreign aid itself.
Repetitive Budgeting. Repetitive budgeting occurs when the budget is continually made and
remade over the course of the fiscal year. Investment budgets are less likely to be subject to
repetitive budgeting, but many governents in Afrca fud recurrent budgets this way, by
default. Aid dependenee exacerbates these tendeneies. With up to a hundred donors, and
hundreds ifnot thousands ofprojects requiring governent cost contrbutions throughout the
year, it is diffcult for all recurrent expenses to be inc1uded in the budget. Donors' and
governents' fiscal years rarely coincide. Donors may anounce new projects at any point in
the governent's fiscal year, and new commitments by donors to projects and programs
mean new expenses for the governent budget. Supplementar budgets are routinely
approved. This reduces the ability of planners to produee realistie estimates and weakens the
incentives for staffto control spending. In Zambia's Second Republic, for example, offcials
gave up even trying to fit the budget to a plan, and the recurrent budget was funded entirely
incrementally (Cromwell1994).
Budget Fragmentation. High degrees of aid dependenee may also exacerbate budget
fragmentation. In an idealized budgetary proeess, the central planng and finanee ministry
prepares estimates of revenues, based on taxes and local revenues. Timely inputs from the
line ministries help create the capital and the recurent budget. With budget fragmentation,
centralized budgetary control erodes, and portions of the budget are prepared at multiple
leveIs, by different governent units (Sekwat 1997). Ministries offinance and planng in
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aid dependent countres are frequently already overburdened tryng to negotiate pressing
matters of debt rescheduling and macroeconomic balance. They lack the capacity to review
and incorporate hundreds of donor projects into their plans. Donors then often negotiate
directly with line ministres or even with regional or local governents, and disburse fuds
directly at those leveIs, even when budgetary centralization is formally required for aid
projects. Projects are often implemented outside of any public investment program; the
governent may not even know oftheir existence (Nordås 1998: 24; Healy 1994: 253).
Donors may report disbursements on their projects to their own governents, but not their
host; the Chinese aid program has been particularly c10sed regarding the reporting of actual
disbursements (Bräutigam 1998).
Aid dependenee is never the only factor operating in these situations. The natue of a
country's political institutions probably also makes a difference. There is some evidence that
the experience of more socialist countres in Afrca has led to stronger states, and greater
controlover the budget. Ethiopia and Tanzania reportedly suffer less from budgetar
fragmentation and loss of centralized control (Kase and Mengitsu 1995).
Public Expenditue Control. Aid dependenee can exacerbate problems of public expenditue
control. There is some econometrc evidence that expectations of aid themselves may induce
weaker fiscal discipline in recipients (Svensson 1995). But large amounts of aid also affect
budgets and fiscal stability directly. At times, unplaned projects anounced midway
through the fiscal year have forced increases ofup to 50 percent in governent investment
budgets (Cromwell1995:196). Commitments may not trans late into disbursements. In these
circumstances, budget exercises become more akin to exercises in magical realism than
grounded in facts.
Foreign aid was originally designed as support for governent investment or capital
expenditures (substituting for savings) or as balanee ofpayments support (substituting for
foreign exchange earnngs). But in heavily aid dependent countries, donor funds are
programmed into both the investment and recurent budgets. In 1993, Mozambique
depended on donor fuding for 61 percent of the recurent budget (Wuyts 1995: 33). Almost
all ofthese fuds are tied up in projects, which require some leve! oflocal contribution.
Countres in this position are then squeezed between the IMF's demands for fiscal rectitude,
and governent spending largely dictated by donors ' demands for local cost contrbutions to
donor-controlled projects.
In Mozambique, for example, the requirements for local co st contributions to several W orId
Ban projects were projected to absorb the agrculture ministry's entire local funds budget
allocation. The mini stry tried to scale back these loan proj ects in order to free funds for local
contributions to several grant-funded projects. But the World Ban threatened to give
controlover the projects directly to the mini stry offinance and planning, while still charging
the local costs to the agrcultue ministr's budget (Wuyts 1995: 35). The mini str backed
down. Dependenee in this case created rigidities that made it more diffcult for a governent
institution to establish its own priorities and to have the flexibility to adjust its spending. In
other cases, governents don't even attempt to scale projects back. Projects create strong
vested interests. They bring in vehic1es, equipment, and sometimes salary supplements. On
their side, donors naturally want their projects to continue, and it is likely that these projects
are making net positive contributions for the moment, and so even though the government
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cannot possibly afford to sustain the project's benefits, the investment continues, and the
mini str again overspends.
Par of the donor response to local governents' inability to support the local costs of
projects has been to supply fuds via the import and local sale of goods from their home
countries.26 Proceeds from the sale ofthese goods ('counterpar fuds') go to support the
donor's projects. When the governent experiences difficulties in supplying any ofits
committed contribution, counterpar fuds often substitute. In these cases, although the
governent clearly cannot absorb this aid or sustain the investment afterwards, donors have
arranged to also supply the governent's contrbution rather than terminate their projects.
While in the short term counterpart funds used in this way allow a project to go forward, they
have several advers e consequences. First, aid is tied twice, first to the paricular imports, and
second to the use of the proceeds.27 Tying counterpart fuds is costly, since tied aid is
generally reckoned to add some 10 to 30 percent to costs (Jepma 1991). In addition, this
entire procedure often takes place outside ofthe countr's budget, causing difficulties for the
management of expenditures.
Ultimately, fuding the local resource gap through counterpart funds aggrevates the problem
it was intended to solve. Once completed, the new investment will continue to require funds
for operation and maintenance, funds that the governent almost certainly wil have
diffculty providing, due in part to the pressure from other donors for local fuds for their
new projects. The local financing gap thus widens. Only by providing counterpart fuds
through program aid, or direct budget transfers, can this problem be avoided (Agbonyitor
1997: 13).
Cash Budgeting. In recogntion oftheir difficulties in managing expenditues, several
countries have been persuaded to adopt cash budgeting, where the governent spends only
what is collected in revenues each month. However, this may only provide an additional
incentive for donors to cover local costs for their projects outside of the budget, ifthey want
the project to continue. Cash budgeting also means that governents stil operate on credit,
they simply force credit from their suppliers and from their employees, as there is often not
enough cash to pay invoices and salaries at the end of the month. This creates morale and
capacity problems in the civil service, as moonlighting increases. Another strategy donors
have used to address the local finaneing gap has been to adopt a matching funds system,
which supplies aid only on the basis of matching fuds from the governent. In Tanana,
this has 'created a strong incentive for revenue collection' (Catterson and Lindhal1998: 20).
In countres with low tax effort, this may be a viable strategy. However, the alternative of
cutting back on donor fuded proj ects and allowing the private sector to invest more of its
profits may be a more sustainable strategy for low income countres.
Managing Monetar Policy. Aid dependenee can affect the management ofmonetary policy
in several ways. When the amounts of aid entering an economy are quite large, the
unpredictability of concessional flows can affect an economy just like extemal 'shocks' due
to a sudden drop or rise in commodity prices. Pressure to supply local fuds for donor
26 These are generally excess commodities, such as United States PL-480 agricultural surluses, although other
donors, like the Chinese, have used these opportities to establish markets for inexpensive consumer goods.
27 Personal communication, Arve Ofstad, Bergen, Norway, October 8, 1998.
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projects may lead to inflationary domestie credit expansion. Large aid flows can also create
pressure on the exchange rate, in the manner of the well-known 'Dutch disease' . The
experience of Ghana illustrates these problems.
Based on donor commitments, Ghana's 1992 medium term budget was built on expectations
of a certain amount of extemal assistance. In 1994, shorlfalls in disbursements amounted to
3.6 percent of GDP, creating a fiscal shock that reverberated for several years, since they had
to be financed through domestie ban borrowing (Botchwey 1997: 24). Large inflows of aid
also created symptoms of Dutch disease in Ghana. Stephen Younger (1992) has analyzed
how the 'boom' of aid shar ly expanded the foreign exchange available in Ghana, forcing
the exchange rate to appreciate. Converting aid money into local cedis expanded the money
supply. The governent's major tool to counteract money supply growth has been to shrnk
domestie credit, primarly through tight credit policies for commercial bans. Y ounger
argues that this tight credit helps explain the poor private sector supply response to Ghana's
economic reforms. In this way, large amounts of aid can actually crowd out the private
sector. 28
Dependenee on aid can also create upward pressure on public and private sector wages. In
Ghana, and elsewhere where minimum wage rates are set by triparite bodies made up of
governent, private sector representatives and trade unions, the high salar levels paid in
donor-fuded Project Management Units were cited as benchmarks for wage negotiations, as
were the improved wage rates paid in the name ofbetter incentives in the parastatal Revenue
Authorities that often accompanied tax reform in adjustment programs. This upward
pressure can make it tremendously difficult for governents to restrain expenditures.
(3) Tax Effort
Without aid, governents in Afrca would have to cut spending, raise taxes, or borrow from
other sources. Chronically high levels of aid may diminish a governents incentive to make
full use of its domestie resources for revenue generation.29 Governents are likely to view
the benefits gained from negotiating aid agreements as higher and the costs lower than
domestie revenue collection, 'the latter task being both administratively more demanding and
politically hazardous' (Sobhan 1996: 128). At the same time, the higher the proportion of
aid in an economy, the lower the probable tax base. Imports for aid projects are usually
exempt from import duties. Foreigners working for NGOs, aid projects, and aid ageneies do
not have to pay Iocal income taxes. In Tanana, a UNP study estimated that the total for
governent wages and salares (which are taxed) was $100 millon, while the salary bil for
techncal assistants supplied under aid programs (and not taxed) was $200 milion! (Berg
1993).30 The relationship between taxation and aid dependency has implications not only for
the institutionalization of a fair and efficient tax regime, but for fiscal policy and for the
development of democratie institutions (Bräutigam 1991, 1996; Moore 1997).
28 Y ounger proposes that govemments in this situation could manage their policies differently by tightenig
fiscal policy still fuer, and loosenig monetary policy to foster private sector investrent (1595).
29 For an excellent analysis ofthese issues, see Moore (1997).
30 The actual cost of the technical assistants (inc1uding benefits, transport, etc.) was $300 million, or triple the
govemments wage costs.
18
A debate currently underway pits one group arguing that Afrcan countries need to reform
their tax systems and ultimately increase their tax receipts, and another that argues that
increasing tax effort would be 'both ludicrous and self-defeating' (Collier 1997: 54). The
IMF, concemed with chronic revenue shortfalls, argues that Afrcan countries 'have
significant potential for raising tax receipts by broadening the tax base, improving tax
administration, and rationalizing the tax system' (Hadjimichael, et al, 1995: 44). Paul
Collier, now research director at the World Bank, argues instead that tax levels in Afrca are
already high. '(RJetarding the growth proeess and inducing evasion, high taxation is delaying
the buildup of the taxable base of the economy and so is delaying the time at which fiscal
sustainability can be achieved' (56). He argues that aid should be used to substitute for
taxation in countries with policies that support private sector development, enabling the
growth of investment and building a base for more sustainable revenue generation after a
time.
The empirical evidence is fairly contradictory on the actual impact of aid (and aid
dependenee ) on tax effort. A 1994 study by Howard White showed that aid in general
reduces tax effort, to the extent of reducing overall governent spending. Conversely,
research conducted with a sample of 18 Afrcan countres (Devarajan et al 1998) suggests
that aid increased overall governent spending and did not reduce tax effort significantly
(although with a sample that includes just over a third of the countries in Sub-Saharan
Afrca, it is diffcult to extrapolate these findings to the entire subcontinent). The tax effort
implications of aid may var dep ending on whether the aid is from loans or grants. A study
examining these issues in the context of South and Southeast Asia found that loans increased
tax effort (because they need to be repaid), while grants reduced it (Khan and Hoshino
1992:1486).
Do Afrcan countres make full use oftheir taxable capacity? A common estimate is that
governent revenues in developing countres probably need to be somewhere around 20
percent ofGDP, although as Angus Maddison (1995: 65) has shown, this is quite a bit higher
than governent expenditures in Europe in the 19th century, which averaged 10 percent of
GDP.31 On average, the revenue raised by low and middle income countries in 1995 came to
about 19 percent ofGDP. The World Ban's World Development Indicators for 1998 has
data on revenue for only 14 Sub-Saharan Afrcan countries. In this small sample, seven
raised more than 20 percent, and seven raised less. The average for low income countries
alone, however, was 10 percent (as in low-income, 19th century Europe), yet all but three
Afrcan countres raised more than 10 percent of GDP in revenue. Another set of data
collected by Peter Heller (1997) from unpublished !M documents and staff estimates gives
revenue levels for 29 Afrcan countries. In the most recent year, only 80fthese raised more
than 20 percent of GDP in revenues. Heller called the tax effort in most of Afrca
'disappointingly low' (39). Finally, Stotsky and WoldeMariam add an ambiguous note to
the debate in their 1997 study on tax effort in Afrca. This study measured tax effort as a
ratio oftax revenues to ameasure oftaxable capacity calculated indirectly through the use of
various proxies for the existing tax base of a country and 'other factors that might affect a
country's ability to raise tax revenues' (1997: 10). Countres with a tax effort ratio above 1.0
(nineteen Sub-Saharan Afrcan countries) were thought to be makng good use oftheir
taxable capacity, those between 0.8 and 1.0 (eight countres) moderate us e, and those below
31 Thanks to Hildegun Nordås for pointing ths out.
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0.8 (sixteen countries) low use.
Does aid dependenee affect tax effort? Table 2 suggests that the index oftax effort in
countries for which aid makes up a smaller percentage of GDP is in fact likely to be above
1.0. Thirt-seven percent of the countres receiving less than 15 percent of GDP in aid had a
tax effort index above 1.0, while only 10 percent of the countres with aid making up more
than 15 percent ofGDP were making good use oftheir available tax base. However, the
correlation between the index oftax effort, and aid dependenee (aid as a percentage ofGNP)
is - 0.30.
Whether one agrees with Coller or with the IMF, it is c1ear that countries in Afrca need a
long term strategy for replaeing the signficant contribution aid makes to their public
finances. Neglecting the development of domestie taxation may also have longer term
implications for democracy building, as well as making fiscal sustainability an ever elusive
goal. Throughout history, the imperative ofraising revenues has generated pressures to build
capacity in a number of institutions, from offces of the budget, to revenue bureaus, to
legislatures. Aid dependenee softens or removes those pressures, and reverses the direction
of accountability.
Table 2: Tax Effort and Aid Dependence
Aid as % of GDP (1996)
Tax Effort (1995)32 0-15 % Above 15%
Above 1.0
Between 0.8 and 1.0
Below 0.8
37%
10%
20%
10%
7%
17%
Source: Stotsky and WoldeMiriam (1997).
Note: Only thir SSA countries have measures both for tax
effort, and aid as % ofGDP.
(4) Democratic Governance and Accountabilty
The impact of aid dependenee on democratie govemanee and accountability cuts to the hear
of the relationship between state and society in Afrca. Aid dependenee can affect
transparency and accountability, and it may contrbute to the continuation of a 'strong
32 Countries with a tax effort index above 1 in 1994-95, meanig that they were making better use oftheir tax
base, were: Botswana, Lesotho, Nambia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola, Burdi, the Comoros,
Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles, Tanzania and Uganda (35). Countries
with a tax effort index below 0.8 durig that period were Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad,
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Pricipe, Sudan,
Congo-Brazaville, and Guinea (Stotsky and WoldeMiriam).
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presidency, weak parliament' syndrome common in Afrca. Finally, aid dependenee may
indirectly help forestall the development of national institutions that can speed adjustment to
fiscal shocks. On the other hand, there is some evidence that aid dependenee may be
associated with greater politicalliberalization and democratie transitions in Afrca (Bratton
and van de Walle 1997: 219-220), although its impact on democratie consolidation remains
to be tested.
Transparency and Accountability. Accountability ought to be primarlya matter between
governents and their citizens, or NGOs and their members. Although the recent wave of
democratie transitions may change this, aid dependenee means that many Afrcan
governents curently face more organized and effective pressures for accountability and
transparency from the IFIs than from their own citizens and parliaments.
Accountability for the use of the public's tax money is one of the primar levers a society has
for enforcing probity and for supporting consistency or change in the goals and vision
formulated by their leaders. In Europe over the past century or so, taxation and disputes over
the use of revenues stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with
democratie institutions enforcing accountability and greater transparency in expenditures. In
many cases, aid dependenee may thwar these proeesses in Afrca.
In order to hold their governents accountable, citizens need information. In particular, they
need published budgets and regular audits by qualified accountants. Off-budget expenditures
(include off-budget aid funding) reduce transparency and make it harder for both the !M
and domestie groups to monitor governent spending (Healey 1995: 253). In addition,
countries that are heavily aid dependent have large sections oftheir public expenditue tied
up in projects whose funds are controlled, monitored, and audited by the donor. Perhaps this
in part accounts for the fact that many Afrcan countries have not developed the capacity to
car out extensive audits. Out of20 Afrcan countres in a recent study, halfhad 25 or
fewer fully qualified accountants in the entire public sector (Makanda 1995: 27).
Yet ultimately, accountability and other institutional strengths and failures are probably more
affected by domestie politicalleadership decisions and the culture of politics than by aid
dependenee and capacity shortages. Only governents can institutionalize accountability.
Tanzana has had an Audit Corporation (TAC) since 1968, supported by the Swedish aid
agency Sida between 1978 and 1993. Yet despite 40-50 person years oftechnical assistance
and a signficant increase in Tanania's auditing capacity, the Sida project was unable to
improve public sector accountability in Tanzania, primarly because the Auditor General's
office (considered 'extremely weak') has never used TAC, or indeed any outside firm, to
audit Tanania's governent accounts (Catterson and Lindhal1998: 76). The most
meaningful reviews ofTanana's accounts are done quite privately, through Public
Expenditure Reviews conducted by the W orId Ban. On the other hand, Nigeria receives a
very small amount offoreign aid as a proportion ofGDP, and the country also has a large
number of qualified public sector accountants (more than 800). Yet Nigeria' s governent
produced its last audited public accounts in 1982 (Makanda, 1995: 31), suggesting again that
other factors are probably more critical for explaining accountability than aid dependence.
NGOs and Accountability. Donor funding ofNGOs, paricularly membership-based
associations, also risks bre akng the links of accountability between members and offcials.
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A Zambian official in the Zambia Chambers of Commerce and Industr (ZACCI)
interviewed by Lise Rakner (1998: 215) sketched this problem quite graphically:
Donor fuding of ZACCI is wrong. It kills the organisation when we are forced to
lick the boots of someone who is financing you. We should diversify and ZACCI
must live within its means, organise seminars, get in subscriptions, hold
conferences, simply we rnust make money. We are compromising ourselves by
receiving donor fuding. .. This is the dependency syndrome and it must be
stopped as we are shooting ourselves in the ar.
Raker charges that the level of donor dependency among NGOs in Zambia has created a
'precarous weakess' in civil society and exacerbated a 'patronage cultue', creating
'limited attachment and commitment to the local membership' (253-54). If aid dependenee
has this impact on NGOs across Afrca, the celebrated associational revolution may be in
trouble.
Democratie Transitions. Aid dependenee may have a positive effect on democratization.
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) found in statistical analysis of29 cases of democratie
transition in Afrca that 'the higher a country's relative leve! of aid flows, the more extensive
were its democratization reforms' (219). Curously, this effect was reversed if donors
explicitly applied political conditionality. Bratton and van de Walle suggest instead that high
levels of aid dependenee interact with high levels of social protest. Governents more
dependent on aid are also more vulnerable to citizen protests. Perhaps both vulnerabilities
reflect other underlying weakesses.
Strong Presidency, Weak ParlIament. Across Sub-Saharan Afrca, political cultures have
produced 'presidentialism', political systems that overprivilege the formal and informal
power of the chief executive.33 Up until1989, large amounts of aid (inc1uding balanee of
payments finaneing from the IMF) helped maintain presidentialism in single par systems
like Zambia's 'longer than it would otherwise have surived' (Cromwell, 1995: 195).
Despite requirements that often existed on paper that parliaments should approve budgets
and projects, in practice donor funding frequently bypassed parliament's scrutiny.
Parliamentar approval takes time, and donors joined with ministers in not taking the
parliamentary role seriously, except in a very few cases (Botswana, for example, where the
governent required donors to take the rules seriously). Finanee ministers presented their
budget and plans not to parliament, but to consultative group meetings in Paris (Sobhan
1996: 197).
With the transition to democracy in many pars of Afrca, presidentialism now faces a
challenge from parliament. But the deeply engrained practices of presidential centralism and
weak parliaments have proven diffcult to change.34 Aid dep endene e contrbutes to these
33 See the discussion in Brattan and van de Walle (1997): 63-65.
34 Lise Rakner's 1998 study of democratization and economic reform in Zambia provides a compelling case
study of the contiuation of presidentialism in Zambia under democratie rule. See also the case of Ghana, where
the 1992 Constitution stipulated that 'The Governent of Ghana cannot contraet a foreign loan without the
approval ofparliament.' Later the govt. ammended ths to allow for 'small foreign loans' which then allowed a
number of agreements to be signed outside of parliamenta scrutiy (p. 367). George A yittey, Africa in Chaos
1998. (Did gov. amend this, or parliament?)
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diffculties through a distinctive political dynamic that revolves around the issues of
accountability, the corrosive effect of dependenee on the development of democratie
institutions, and the resources aid provides for patronage. Bargaining over the budget and
over tax policy is one of the primar ways in which different state and societal goals are
reconciled in a democracy. One of the critical roles of a legislature is to address budget
issues. This clearly requires that all actual and projected governent spending, whether
funded by donors or not, be inc1uded in the budget, so that legislatures can master its
intricaeies, and provide needed balanee to presidential and ministerial. But aid dependent
countries in which large amounts ofproject funding continue to be off-budget present a
challenge to this aspect of democratie consolidation.
Democratie Institutions and Fiscal Adjustment. In more developed countres, research
suggests that constitutions with tighter expenditue rules may promote more rapid adjustment
to fiscal shocks (porterba 1994: 799). This seems to be the case as well in Latin America
(Alesina et al 1996). Institutions that promote fiscal probity can inc1ude rules that limit the
size of the deficit, or the ability of governents to car the deficit into the next budget.
They may limit deficit financing to short-term debt, or require referendum before a
governent can issue bonds or undertake other long-term debt. In aid dependent countries,
expectations that deficits wil be met by foreign aid may stop these kinds of institutions from
developing.
Managing a Transition From Aid Dependence
Aid was never intended to be a permanent feature of the international political economy. Yet
over the past fift years, very few developing countres have ever graduated from the aid
system.35 In Afrca, most countres have seen aid become a signficant share oftheir GDPs,
and 'all too often, Afrcan governents have found cozy accommodation with dependency,
despite adopting the rhetoric of self-reliance' (Mule et al 1996: 7). Yet the rise in aid
dependenee and the loss of sovereignty and ownership are uneven across Afrcan countries.
Decisions made at independence in some Afrcan nations paved the way for greater capacity
and may have created a path dep endene e that enforced sovereignty and ownership. This
happened in different ways in Maurtius and Botswana (Goldsmith 1998; Carroll and Carroll
1997).
(1) Mauritius, Botswana, and Eritrea
In Maurtius, even the World Bank (1992: 1) has commented on the high degree oflocal
ownership of reform plans. This local ownership may have its roots in the experience of
colonialism and independence, as well as in the institutions of Maurtian political practice.
As Carroll and Joypaul point out, in Mauritius 'the proeess of'nativization' had begun well
35 Different donors use different crIteria for 'graduation'. For example, a number of countries inc1uding Korea,
Belize, Botswana, and Mauritius have 'graduated' and no langer receive economic aid from the us. Agency
for International Development. At least 20 low income countres have seen their incames rise enough so that
they no longer qualify for concessional fuds from the The World Bank's IDA window. However, Barbados
appears to be the only developing countr to have trly graduated from the World Bank. Korea graduated in
1994, but is now again receiving World Bank funds. Taiwan's membership was revoked in 1971.
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before independence' (430,435). Only four British senior civil servants remained by 1971,
just after independence. The rules of politics in democratie Mauritius support a high degree
of continuity in the professional bureaucracy. Generally only cabinet-level offices are
shuffed in political tuovers. Capacity levels are high in the bureaucracy, and the countr
supports a vigorous and lively democracy (Bräutigam 1997). In 1990, aid amounted to about
15 percent of central governent expenditures, but by 1994, that figure had dropped to 2
percent.
Botswana followed a very different strategy, but with equally successful results.36 Botswana
and Mauritius gained independence within a few years of each other, but capacity levels in
Botswana were far weaker. The country had only 22 college graduates, for example. The
Botswana leadership made several decisions that have also reinforced the governent' s
ability to manage aid resources. First, the governent decided to make use of expatriate
personneI in line positions in the ministries, replaeing them only when local people were
adequately trained to take over those specific posts. Expatriates generally occupy mid-level
advisory and analytical positions, but not the high leve! decision-makng posts. Techncal
assistanceis assessed and us ed not on a project-by-project basis, but according to manpower
development plans prepared sector-by-sector for the economy as a whole. Ifthe techncal
assistance required for the plan is not available locally, or provided by donors or volunteer
services (on request), the government advertises and hires international staffitself. Second,
the governent established a very strong Ministr of Finanee and Development Plannng,
which construets the country's six year development plans, prepares projects as needed
(together with the appropriate line ministr), and only then matches projects with appropriate
donors.37 Line ministries do not negotiate directly with donors. All projects and programs
must be approved by parliament. All aid money and local revenues are integrated together
into the budget. The governent is quite willng to reject offers of aid that do not fit within
the plan.
Although Mauritius and Botswana are now relatively wealthy compared with other Afrcan
countries, they did not star out that way.38 Wealth does not appear to be highly correlated
with ownership and effective aid management, at least not at the start. The new leadership of
Eritrea, independent in 1993 after a decades long civil war, has stressed local ownership of
projects and programs.39 The countr has refused to delegate responsibility for socIal welfare
programs and vilage leve! development to NGOs, few ofwhich have been invited in.
Because Eritrea became independent without any debt, the W orId Ban has little leverage
and along with bilateral donors, has been forced to fall in line with the plans and programs of
36 Ths discussion of Botswana draws on Maipose, Somolekae and Johnston (1997), Nordås (1998), Raker
(1996) and Nordås, Sekgoma, and Somolekae (1998).37 Despite very different cultures and histories, Botswana's institutional management ofits aid relationships
echoes the early experiences of Korea and Taiwan, which both established centralized economic planng
boards. For example, the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) in Taiwan, established in 1951, was chaired by
the mIister of fmance, and was the only entity empowered to approve foreign and domestie loans to the
governent (Haggard, 86). The ESB was later replaced by the Joint Commssion on Rural Reconstrction, and
the Council on International Economic Cooperation and Development.
38 Data from Africa Development Indicators on relative wealth in 1968 or sa to be added.
39 The discussion of Eritrea is based on personal communication from David Hirschmann, Washington, DC,
February 1998, and on Norwegian Agency for Development (NORA) Annua! Report for 1997, Oslo:
NORAD, pp. 16-18.
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the governent. The country's leaders are clearly affected by their analysis of aid
dependenee in other Afrcan countries, and have announced a goal of phasing out all foreign
aid over time. As par of their effort to maintain self-reliance, Eritrea plans to eliminate all
grant funding and accept only carefully selected loans for investments that fit into their
development plans. One ofthese loans has already been concluded, for capacity
strengthening of the central goverment. This experiment is well worth watching for its
potential impact on sovereignty, local ownership, and self-reliant development.
These cases suggest that politicalleadership is aneeessar, ifnot sufficient, factor in makng
effective use of aid and avoiding the possibly debilitating effect ofhigh levels of aid. Yet
given that most other countries in Afrca have suffered instead from a combination of poor
leadership and inappropriate and often self-serving donor responses, what can now be done
to remedy the situation? What will promote changes in the norms, values, pattems of
behavior - in local and international institutions - that have been so deeply affected by the
incentives build into the curent aid system?
(2) A Strategy for Reducing Aid Dependence
A strategy for reducing aid dependenee in Afrca needs to proceed from several basic
principles. (1) Aid can be helpful for development, supplementing domestie savings and
foreign exchange earnngs, as Chenery and Strout hypothesized long ago. (2) But aid is only
as effective as the environment in which it is used. Research suggests quite strongly that aid
given to govemments with poor macroeconomic policies and political instability neither
promotes growth nor human development (Burside and Dollar 1997; Madavo and Sarbib,
1998). (3) The ambitions of donors in very poor countries have overshot local capacities by
a large margin, creating unsustainable 'enc1aves of development' divorced from local
realities. At the same time, the lack of attention to the collective medium and long-term
impact of prematue and unsustainable expansion of governent programs has created some
ofthe fiscal problems that plague Afrcan countres. The role and reach of the state has to be
proportional to the strength of the local revenue (tax) base, which suggests that only by
building up the private sector will governents be able to sustainably build up the social
sectors.
Donors are limited in what they can do with aid. There are no magic keys to unlock the door
to development from outside; it only opens from within. Donors can train accountants,
reorganize ministres, hold action-planng workshops with stakeholders, and use
conditionality to tr and force change, but when local norms and practices - local institutions
- do not support accountability, rational bureaucracy, or paricipation, these wil have little
lasting impact. Institutions matter, and they matter more than donor-provided savings and
foreign exchange.
The question then becomes: can aid be used to promote good leadership, good policies, and
good institutions? And the answer to this is, probably not, at least not directly. To the extent
that it can, this wil dep end on the strength of internal democratie forces. Conditionality has
c1early failed either to produee lasting economic reforms, or to produee consolidated
democracies.40 The best foreign aid can probably do is to reinforce a leadership that is
40 For the impact of conditionality on economic reform in Africa, see the discussions in Johnson and Wasty
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already committed. At the worst, because it is highly fungible, aid can maintain
uncommitted governents in power longer than they would otherwise be able to stay.
We believe the aid system as it presently exists needs fudamental reform. Only then can the
ownership of development initiatives be shifted back to Afrcan governents and their
societies, where it belongs. Even though all involved recognze the problems multiple
donors and NGOs are creating for countres dependent on aid, the existing incentives and
demands make it difficult for countries to tu down offers of fuding, or for donors to
voluntar1y concentrate on a single sector, align their procurement requirements with other
donors, abandon 'tied' aid, or to simply wind down their programs and leave.
Below we outline several elements of a medium and long-term strategy for reducing the
deleterious impact of aid dependenee on Afrcan institutions. We advocate (1) increased
debt relief, but at the same time, (2) greater ex post selectivity; and for countres that meet the
selectivity criteria, we recommend (3) a shif from project to program funding. For countries
that do not meet these criteria, we suggest, first, humantaran assistanee where this is called
for; second, aid targeted at identifiable vulnerable groups and disbursed through domestie
non-governental organizations (NGO's) with a track record of democratie govemanee and
accountability; and third, aid disbursed through regional demand drven foundations for
regional projects and programs and basic capacity building. (4) Finally, we believe that
Afrcan governents should themselves develop, in consultation with donors, a timetable for
an orderly termination of aid.
(1) Increased Debt Relief. The bilateral donors have provided extensive debt reliefto
Afrcan countres over the past ten years or so, often across the bo ard, but sometimes tied to
performance. Recently the multilaterals have begun a lengthy proeess that may lead to relief
for multilateral debt in the most highly indebted countries (RIPC), a proeess that will take up
to six years in each eligible countr, and dep end on strict adherence to !M policy
guidelines. While the HIPC is at least a step forward, it stil operates under the assumption
that the IFIs, and the World Bank in paricular, bear no responsibility, and therefore should
bear no burden, for all the 'bad' loans they made, particularly the 10 ans for multiple projects
that were in retrospect, c1early not well-designed for the environment in which they were to
operate or with budgetary sustainability in mind.4! Take for example the Gorgol irrgation
project fuded for Mauritania (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997: 706). Approved despite an
appraisal giving a rate ofretum of 5.5 percent (later re-worked to 7 percent), and projections
that the recurrent costs would exceed the total anual income of the project's beneficiares,
(1993), Collier (1997), Collier, Guilaumont, Guillaumont, and Guning (1997). On conditionality and
democracy, see Brattan and van de Walle (1997).
4 i The argument is made that Wfitig off same of these bad loans across the board would lower the Bank' s
credit ratig, raising the interest it must pay for the fuds it raises, and punish its more credit-worty members
who have been servicing their debts. Conversely, some argue that loan wrte-offs might increase problems of
moral hazard, where countres will apply their loans to riskier investments than they normally would, in the
belief that these loans wil eventually be forgiven. But we believe these arguents miss the point. All lending
is subject to these problems; should the Bank be insultated from the results of its decisions? It is important to
introduce same aspects of a real bank environment into the World Bank. First, staff need to consider each loan
in the context of the projected future incame of the entie countr, and the projected futue debtburden, in order
to judge whether the countr wil be able to afford the payments on the loan. Clearly, if ths inormation is not
even available, no loan should be made. Second, staffneed to face pressure not to make 'bad loans' to at least
the same degree as they currently face pressure to move money now.
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the project was ultimately an expensive failure for a very poor countr, but still added $100
million to Mauritania's debt. Loan write-offs that are c1early linked to the failure or poor
performanee of the specific projects they fuded might stimulate some kind of sanctions
(even if informal) within the IFIs for those responsible for proj ects like that in Mauritania
that had such poor outcomes. A dollar of debt relief also avoids almost all of the institutional
problems that can be associated with a dollar ofprogram or project aid, inc1uding exchange
rate appreciation, and seems a better use of funds.
(2) Greater Ex Post Selectivity. It has long been the case that, as Jacoby noted in 1967, 'aid
for development must be conditioned upon the pursuit of developmental policies by the aided
countr ifit is to be effective' (131). Donors have in the past given aid in futheranee oftheir
own political and strategic interests that had little to do with good policies in the recipient
countries (Bumside and Dollar 1997). It is time to practice more principled se1ectivity by
chanellng more funds toward countres that can make good use ofthem; by rewarding
commitment (Coller et al 1997). Research strongly suggests, and the experience of
Botswana, Mauritius, Taiwan, and South Korea confirm, that aid delivered to countries with
developmental policies, and a clear idea oftheir own specific needs, can be quite effective in
promoting growth and human development, whereas aid delivered to countries with poor
policies has no noticeable impact.
What should be the criteria used for ex post selectivity? Political stability and
macroeconomic stability appear to be baselines for a developmental state. The importanee of
keeping fiscal and current account deficits modest now enjoys a very wide consensus, as
does the need to keep the exchange rate from becoming overvalued, and the importanee of
promoting diversified exports. In the final analysis, export-led growth in manufacturers and
services is what enabled East Asia to graduate from aid. But many of the other e1ements of
the neo liberal prescription, in particular the timing and sequence of the liberalization of
trade, the financial sector, and the capital account, are stil hotly debated. These debates wil
probably increase as a result of the East Asian crisis. Given the fact that no organzation or
region has a monopoly on a guaranteed path to development, it seems that the benefits of
Afrcan governents being able to set their own liberalization goals and learnng, even if
more slowly and with mistakes, what it takes to get there, might ultimately build more
lasting capacity and contribute to an end to aid dependence.
Donors are likely, and with good reason, to want to also base selectivity on evidence of
improvements in state capacity and govemance, paricularly accountability and budget
management, public expenditure transparency, and a plausible medium-term plan for
increasing domestie resource mobilization and foreign exchange earngs in order to
gradually boost self-reliance. The noted economist Sir Arhur Lewis remarked in 1969 that
'those who give aid are entitled to ask whether the recipients are using the opportnity of
foreign aid to increase steadily the share oftaxes and savings in national income' (52). The
same can surely be said for foreign exchange earnngs. Even if aid to Afrca continues to
dec1ine overall (a realistic projection) but is then chanelled more narowly toward countries
that can usefully absorb it, foreign aid in Afrca may finally star to showevidenee of more
wide-spread growth and development. Research suggests that the large amounts of aid
chanelled to Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s 'quadrpled the anual growth ofper capita
GNP, and cut thirt years from the time needed to attain 1964living standards. . . Actual per
capita GNP of 1964 would not have been produced until1995' (Jacoby 1967: 152).
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Afrca has as yet no local model the way Chile served as a model in Latin America, and
Japan in East Asia. But in the right environment, a concentration of aid may produee quite
visible results, which could produee a model or models that would help convince other
governents of the virtues ofbetter economic policies and govemanee (Collier 1997: 66).
But ultimately, the goal of selectivity is to retum the initiative for development back to
Afrcan governents and people. Two additional changes should support this: a shift to
program support (for selected countres) and a shift to demand-driven fuds and basic
capacity support, for countries not yet able to receive program aid.
(3) Abandon the Project Mode of Aid Delivery and Switch to Program Support. Funding
ageneies were originally created to supply fuds for countres whose own savings and
foreign exchange eamings fell short oftheir needs. If developmental policies are in place,
there is then no reason for donors to be designng or implementing projects on behalf of the
country, or for providing 'tied' aid or techncal assistance. This implies more than 'mov(ing)
toward empowering our c1ients to take the leadership and share ownership of operations' as a
1994 World Bank directive urged. Rather, it implies that once a country meets the criteria
for selectivity, funding should be integrated into the budget and managed by the country
itself.
For a c1early delimited interim period, funding ageneies might help establish in selected
Afrcan countres the kind of centralized parastatal economic co-operation councils set up in
Taiwan and Korea, or the foreign aid management unts in Botswana's Ministry ofPlanng
and Economic Development. These councils would have responsibility for managing the
winding down of aid already committed to projects, and the move to program fuding,
possibly on a sector basis, as the UNP and the World Bank have recently been promoting
(Harold 1995; Jones 1997).42 One way to do this might be to establish a review board for
economic co-operation activities, extemal to the council, but with joint representation from
donor ageneies and council staff. Participation could be encouraged through the democratie
proeess: the submission ofthese recommendations for parliamentar debate and approval,
which would involve the people's elected representatives.
With fuds no longer tied to the projects ofparicular funding ageneies, developing countres
would be free to fill their manpower gaps and obtain their technical assistanee from a variety
of sources, much as did the European late developers and Japan. Many wi1likely look to
Asia: to India and China, both ofwhich have extensive numbers ofwell-qualified advisers
42 See UN General Assembly Resolution 44/21 1 of 1989. See also UNP's manual on 'Guidelines for
Programme Support Document (PSD),' November 1993, and Harrold (1995) and Jones (1997). Jones notes
that 'There is tension between the ideal oflocal ownership ofboth the content and proeess and what was termed
by one donor representative a 'rnassive and rapid' initiativ e from the World Bank to promote the SIP (Sector
Investrent Program) modeL.' (5). Harrold notes the tension in the Sector approach 'between requiring good
capacity to exist as the basis for the SIP, and using the SIP proeess to develop ths capacity.' (22) He
recommends that befare a SIP can work, govemments need to have good leadership capacity, and be 'wiling
and able to take the lead and to tell donors what is and is not acceptable.' There also has to be well developed
capacity 'in project management, especially in term offmancial management and procurement. Ths means a
good record in tieliness of project audits, the absenee of serious fmancial scandals, and preferably an ability to
handle large volumes ofprocurement, ideally with standard procurement documents' (22). These would all be
important preconditions befare a shift to program aid is implemented.
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and techncians who are undoubtedly much less expensive than those from the West. The
competition that will result from the untying of aid should stimulate the transformation of aid
ageneies into sources of skilIs and knowledge, and help them to make a transition away from
the career incentives ,and disbursement imperatives that curently exist.
The move to program aid should only happen where the underlying policy and govemanee
fundamentals are in place, as outlined above in the section on selectivity. In paricular,
countres need to be able to develop and implement their own sectoral plans and projects,
make their own determinations of manpower gaps, and decide themselves how those will be
filled. Only in this way can aid relationships become tre rather than fictional partnerships.
For countres moving toward greater local ownership of development initiatives, the
transition period to program aid might take five or ten years. For those not yet ready,
councils could serve as a way to wind down project aid over the same five or ten years, with
the goal oflimiting funds in these countries to humanitarian aid, demand-drven funds
disbursed by regional foundations and basic capacity strengthening.
(4) Establish Demand-Driven Foundations, and Basic Capacity Strengthening. For the
foreseeable future, the majority of Afrcan countres wil not meet the criteria for selectivity
outlined above. If it is tre that aid delivered to countres laeking developmental policies has
no measurable impact on growth or development, than it is clear that the existing system of
aid, in those countres, needs to be changed. We propose a shift in two directions: toward
demand-drven foundations established on a regional basis and funded by multiple donors,
and basic capacity strengthening, through long-term commitments that build human resource
capacity and maintain commitments to basic and applied research, or that address regional
issues, such as conflict resolution, malaria and AIs.
Demand-drven foundations would be modeled after private foundations, or the social
investment fuds operating in many countries, which respond to requests formulated by
individuals and groups for locally identified needs.43 These funds could be us ed to build
capacity in and outside ofweak states. They would be able to resp ond to specific project
proposals submitted by central and local governent units, and non-governental groups.
Successful proposals wil be those that enhance capacity without requiring unsustainable
recurent costs. There might be an initial step in which proposals are reviewed by ajoint
governental/non-governental committee in each country, before being fOfWarded to the
regional foundation. In this way, even when the politicalleadership is not developmentally
minded, developmenta1 initiatives ofthose at lower levels can stil be reinforced, and might
prove to be role mo dels and exemplars.44 It would be important that these foundations be
truly demand-driven, responding to proposals submitted by a varety of entities, on a
43 See the insightfl and detailed discussion by Göran Hydén (1995) on autonomous development fuds in the
special issue of Development Dialogue published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It is wort noting that
when the AID program phased out in Taiwan in 1965, the U.S. established a Sino-American Fund for
Economic and SocIal Development which took control of the local curencies generated by the remaing
commodity imports, and the debt service owed to the U.S. (Jacoby 1967: 231). The U.S. specified that 15
percent offunds should ga to agriculture, annually, and that 'all projects were to conform to developmental
criteria, meet technical and economic feasibility tests, and emphasize research and inovation' (232). Decisions
on iì.mdig of projects were to be made solely by the governent in Taiwan.
44 For examples ofhow local governent officials can make a difference even when the central governent
cannot, see Leonard (1991) and Tendler (1998).
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competitive basis.45 Having fuds on a regional basis would eliminate country programing
as a framework for disbursements in countries that did not qualify for program aid, and break
the 'disbursement imperatives' that curently characterize aid and have led to some of the
institutional problems outlined above.
Asecond initiative could focus on capacity strengthening over the longer term by targetting
fuds to support some of Afrca's formerly excellent unversities, regional agrcultural
research centers (along the lines of the CGIA agrcultual centers), schools ofpublic
administration, training in higher leve1 science and technology expertise required by a global
economy, or programs that combat threats like malara or AIs, on a regional basis. These
institutions would not be expected to be sustainable without extemal support, and funding
ageneies could usefully 'adopt' these centers, programs, and universities, making long-term
commitments.46
(5) Establish a Credible Timetable for the Eventual Termination of Program Aid. Aid is
likely to continue as long as poverty levels and income disparties remain so acute in the
developing world. However, bilateral aid programs in many countres are already being
wound down or reconsidered, and the political geography of aid is like1y to look quite
different in another decade. How should decisions be made about aid termination? The
issue is diffcult if aid is given solelyon the basis of need (without regard to how well it will
be used), because clearly a Samaritan's dilemma exists where it might be to a governent's
advantage to project greater needs, so that it can obtain greater aid. But if aid is directed only
toward governents that are already on the right track toward self-sustaining development,
this is less likely to be a problem.
In these cases, the timetable for aid termination should involve a series of steps and plateaus,
keeping in mind that the primar purose of aid is to supplement gaps in domestie savings
and foreign exchange. Aid should be quite concessional and generous for the first big push,
finaneing imports and providing a large share of investment. With these resources, countres
should be able to purehase expertise on the international market, as Prussia, Russia, and
Japan did at the end of the 19th centu. Par of the aid mission should be to facilitate this,
by serving as a source ofknowledge, linking the countr's offcials to information networks
about development policies, technologies, and promising innovations, and organizing study
trps and internships for lower level but full-of- promise officials. This should promote
learnng from 'successful' upper middle-income developing countries whose recent history is
relevant for low-income countries seeking to move up several steps.
At the same time, aid missions can help to promote the countr as a destination for foreign
investment, and as a source of export goods, both ofwhich should help build foreign
exchange reserves. Over time, as formal sector employment and production grow, and
savings rates rise, the revenue base should improve, and the fiscal gap should narow. When
per capita income leveIs, the savings rate, and foreign exchange reserves reach some agreed
45 They would also need frameworks of rules that would allow fUiids that were unused to be rolled over to the
following year.
46 Many bilateral aid ageneies are required to operate on year to year budgets, which would make these kinds of
commtrents diffcult without changes in legislation governing the aid program. USAID recently was able to
obtain arevision of the Foreign Assistance Act which enabled it to use grant money to create local currency
endowments (Hydén 1995: 48).
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upon level, the terms of aid should harden from grants and highly concessionalloans to
terms more closely approximating market leveIs. This could happen in several steps before
aid fuding is terminated completely, and even then, an endowed fud should remain behind
to support projects for an additional specified period.47
It is useful again to retum to the East Asian experience, upon which this strategy is loosely
based. Both Korea and Taiwan were dependent on US. aid at levels that resemble many
Afrcan countries. In 1959, before the governent in Taiwan had adopted the momentous
19-Point Program ofEconomic and Financial Reform, 'the Director ofthe AI Mission (to
Taiwan J proposed that the (Taiwanese J governent should adopt a comprehensive set of
public policies to foster private investment and expand exports, looking toward the phasing-
out of US. aid' (Jacoby 1967: 35). US. governent officials made aid termination to
Taiwan a firm policy goal in 1960 once the 19-Point Program had been adopted and they felt
that the island was on the right track to self-sustaining growth. The official announcement in
May 1964 of a June 1965 date for aid termination further stiffened the governent' s
reformist zeal. 'Confronted with the reality of economic self-support in another year, the
governent acted in many ways to fuher improve the climate for private investment, to
promote exports, and to seek capital and credit from the World Ban, the Export-Import
Bank, and other countries. It dispatched trade missions to Latin America and Afrca, and
eased controls of foreign exchange and payments (ibid, 230). ,48
In Korea, on the other hand, the first significant fiscal and monetar reforms were undertaken
in 1958, 'in response to reduced aid leveIs' (Keger and Ruttan 1989: 229). Relations
between the US. and Korea cooled for several years after a 1960 coup removed the corrpt
but democratie President Syngman Rhee and established a military governent. During this
time, the new governent attempted to free the country from its heavy dependenee on the
US. in order to have a freer rein in its domestie polities. It was also reacting to the US.
anouncement that the level ofits aid would 'gradually decline' (ibid: 234). The Korean
governent then sought loans from the World Bank (1962) and from other bilateral donors.
Bilateral aid from the US. ended in 1974.49 Korea graduated from most other bilateral
programs in the early 1980s.
It is important to keep in mind that the US. terminated aid to both countries only when
they looked to be firmly situated on a self-sustaining growth path. But part of the
incentive for getting on that path appears to have been the knowledge that the aid program
was temporary. Because so many donors currently operate aid programs in Africa, a
consensus on a coordinated program for phasing out aid may be diffcult to reach. Yet the
new reconsideration offoreign aid in light of the end of the Cold War War and the long-
term objective interest of the Afrcan countries themselves may force such a shift, in fact if
not in announced intention. It would be better for Afrca to plan for an orderly transition,
rather than have it happ en as the end result of an accumulation of ad hoc bilateral and
47 USAID appears to be settg a funds like this up in Zimbabwe, as it phases out the aid program there.
Personal communication, David Hirschman, October 1998.
48 Although new commtments to the U.S. aid program in Taiwan ended on June 30, 1965, the U.S. continued
to disburse fuds that were already commtted, and contiued to provide surlus agricultual commodities for
use in generating local counterpart fuds, for several more years (Jacoby 1967).
49 Except (as in the case of Taiwan) for several more years of concessional PL-480 commodity loans (Kreger
and Ruttan 1989: 233).
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multilateral actions.
Conclusion
The challenge of aid in the 21 st century may very well be how to do more with less. Levels
of aid have been falling since 1989, but this may not be as problematie as it seems for many
Afrcan countries. Many highly aid dependent countries are c1early not able to absorb all of
the fuds that are presently on offer, and high flows of aid in many ofthese countres have
had some perncious institutional effects. At the same time, aid flows are not high enough in
Afrcan countries with good policies and greater absorptive capacity.
In countries where the politicalleadership is not committed to maintaining developmental
policies, high levels of aid can have institutional costs, including organzational overload,
capacity weakening, loss of ownership, revenue instability and budget fragmentation, lower
tax effort, and the undermining of accountability and democratie decision-making. None of
these costs are inevitable, and countries like Botswana, Mauritius, Korea and Taiwan have
all been able to absorb large amounts of aid without ill effect. Over time, these countres
have moved signficantly c10ser toward, or even succeeded in, graduating from the
international aid system. The difference seems to be related to domestie polities, and
policies.
These experiences suggest that aid needs to reinforce norms and rules - institutions - that
provide incentives for good policies and good govemance. Our recommendations involve a
shift toward an aid system that rewards countres that are already makng c1ear moves toward
political stability and macroeconomic balance, encouraging diversified exports, and creating
an environment where their private sectors will grow, building a sustainable tax base that can
support governent programs. To encourage the leadership ofmore countries to pursue
these goals, we argue for signficant changes in the international aid system, inc1uding
greater debt relief and greater selectivity. Countries that meet selectivity criteria are much
more likely to use aid fuds wisely, and we recommend a shift toward program support in
these cases. For countres that do not meet selectivity criteria, we recommend that aid be
scaled down, and limited to basic capacity building, through demand-based funds and
support on a regionalleve1 for basic and applied research and university leve1 science and
technology education, and programs that combat AIDs and other problems that are regional
in scope. Finally, we argue that aid programs need to be seen as temporar, and primarilyas
supplements to a country's own efforts to fill the signficant savings and foreign exchange
gaps tyical at low income leveIs, or as responses to emergency situations. The eventual
termination of aid needs to be anticipated and planned for in a thoughtful manner. 1fthese
changes are implemented, high levels of aid dep endene e should become an enabling factor in
the efforts of Afrcan countries to become truly self-reliant.
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Appendix A: Case Study Questions
for Evaluating the Institutional Impact of Aid Dependenee
General
· What are the total aid disbursements over the past ten years, and how does this break down into
project, program, and other aid? What percentage of GDP/GNP is made up of aid, and how has this
changed? What is the ratio between aid inflows and actual debt service outfows?
· How many multilateral, UN, and bilateral agencies operate in the countr? How many
international NGOs?
· Have any donors terminated their aid prograrns or made plans for terminating their programs in the
near future? Were any ofthese programs terminated because (a) the countr was unable to manage
the volume and tye of aid provided; or (b) the countr was considered able to raise its own funding,
either on the capital market or through own resources?
· Does the leadership have a clear vision for the goals and objectives of policy and programs? What
measurable progress has the countr made toward those goals?
Project and Program Implementation
· Does the governent have a single unit that has responsibility for signing loan and grant
documents and coordinating donor aid? If so, do donors respect these requirements?
· Does the governent have a single unit that coordinates with NGOs?
· What percentage of govemment line positions are unfilled? What percentage are filed by
expatrates? Does the governrnent have clear plans as to how it wil eventually fill these positions
with nationals?
Ownership
· For major projects and prograrns undertaken by the governent, where was the locus ofinitiative?
· How deep was the leve! of intellectual conviction among key policyrnakers?
· Were there expressions ofpolitical wil by top leadership?
. What were the efforts made by the top leadership toward consensus-building among various
constituencies?
Finance, Planning, and Budgeting
· To what extent are all donor project costs included in the countr's development and recurrent cost
budgets?
· What is the gap between domestic investment needs, and amount filled by dornestic resources?
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Foreign exchange needs? How have these gaps changed over the past two decades?
· How competitive are local government salaries cornpared with the private sector? What is donor
practice in 'topping up' local salaries?
· Have donor salary scales created upward pressure on public and private sector wages? Is this
pressure sustainable?
· Has the government' s budget undergone many significant changes over the year as a result of new
donor commitments and projects?
· How much ofthe governments budget is devoted to servicing donor projects?
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Summary
Heavy aid dependence can have significant effects on
institutions and governance. In Botswana, Mauritius,
Korea and Taiwan, high levels of aid reinforced local
capacity, enabling thern to 'graduate' from most aid. But
in many countries, the costs of aid dependence have been
high. Aid dependence can overload institutions and
weaken capacity and ownership, create revenue instability
and fragrnent budgets, lower tax effort, and undermine
accountability and democratic decision-making. These
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differently for countries with 'good' institutions and those
without.
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